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number of the firms are owned by families in Pakistan. Agency disagreements and
issues  exist  between the management  and the owners  as  well  as  the minority
shareholders  and  the  block  holders.  To handle  these  feuds,  accountants  use
discretionary  accruals.  These  accruals  help  to  manage  earnings  and  smooth
sharp trends to protect the interest of management and the owners. This study
determines  whether  the  investors  manage  the  earnings  through  discretionary
accruals or do they price these accruals when considering the stock price. This
study finds significant evidence that the market prices discretionary accruals. We
find that the firms with higher number of institutional ownership, high quality
audit  production  and  higher  number  of  independent  board have  significantly
higher impact of  discretionary accruals on their stock returns as compared to
other firms.
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1. Introduction
In today’s modern business, most of the firms are owned by the families.
Major agency conflict and issues exist not only between the management and the
owners but between the minority shareholders and the management (controlling
family) as well. Trust holds a key position in today’s financial analysis procedures
due to increased agency conflicts. Management is answerable to the shareholders
for their each and every decision. There are many other stakeholders in the firm
and everyone tries to make such decisions into his/her best interest.
Discretionary accruals or earnings management is one of the examples in
which accountants try to make earnings smooth as per the will of authorities. A
need  has  been  observed  which  leads  to  the  concept  of  emerged  appropriate
corporate governance. In the continuation, securities and exchange commission of
Pakistan gave a code of Corporate Governance.  Good governance is a sign of
good corporate performance as it prevents the stampede on the rights of minority
shareholders and ensures better decision making. 
The main purpose of this paper is  to study the impact of discretionary
accruals on the stock valuation of the company. This paper further investigates
whether ownership structure, firm size and corporate governance practices affect
the discretionary accruals of the firm or not and do investors view discretionary
accruals differently in the existence of good corporate governance practices.
Good  governance  means  that  managers  or  controlling  shareholders
contribute toward better  utilization of corporate resources which lead to better
performance. Lenders and investors are more willing to invest in a firm with good
governance,  which lowers the cost of capital  as the firm is  expected to invest
better  in  the future.  Not only investors  and lenders  but  other  stakeholders i.e.
suppliers and employers want to work with such firms having good governance.
Such  relationship  will  be  more  beneficial,  prosperous  and  long  lasting  as
compared to the relationship with weak and less effectively governed firms.
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Over  the  last  few  decades,  role  of  corporate  governance  has  gained
prominence.  Corporate  governance  is  not  only  a  procedure  through  which
directors are elected and make decisions, in fact, it also provides a clear way for
the accountability of the firms. One of the ways through which the accountability
reached is via financial reporting. Pricing of discretionary accruals is one of the
financial reporting issues.
Various  studies  discussed  the  impact  of  different  corporate  governance
variables  on the pricing of discretionary accruals.  Gul,  F. A, S.  Lung, and B.
Srinidhi, (2000) examined the impact of debt and investment opportunity set as a
proxy for growth on the pricing of discretionary accruals. They concluded that
firms with higher growth have higher prices of discretionary accruals as compared
to other firms with lower growth. While the impact of debt on the relation of stock
returns and discretionary accruals are not significantly strong enough. Krishnan
(2003)  examined  the  impact  of  audit  quality  of  a  firm  on  its  pricing  of
discretionary accruals.  Researcher  found that  firms having high standard audit
firms (Big-6) have discretionary accruals priced more highly than those of other
firms, which are not audited by Big-6 audit firms.
Impact of ownership structure, firm size and other corporate governance
practices on the market pricing of discretionary accruals is the core theme of this
paper.  In  case  of  developing  economies,  inadequate  literature  is  available
regarding pricing of discretionary accruals and its effects on ownership structure,
especially  for  Pakistan.  Eldomiaty  (2008) mentioned  that  because  of  the
insufficient  information  problems,  the  capital  markets  of  the  developing
economies are not efficient enough to compare with developed market. Therefore,
the  outcomes  of  the  developed  countries  cannot  be  generalized  with  the
developing countries like Pakistan where political risk is very high. Fluctuations
in  rules  regarding  corporate  governance  are  very  frequent,  family  ownership
structure is very common, and the corporate structure is in developing phase. So,
in this developing economy, it sounds very interesting to find out the pricing of
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discretionary accruals, effects of ownership structure, firm’s size and corporate
governance practices in Pakistan.
 The  main  purpose  is  to  identify  the  empirical  evidence  related  to  the
impact of different governance variables on pricing of discretionary accruals. For
this study, we have selected a random sample of 30 firms listed in Karachi Stock
Exchange for the time period 2008-2013.
The  first  section  of  this  paper  contains  introduction,  whereas,  second  section
contains literature review, data and methodology is presented in third section, and
the fourth section contains results and conclusion. 
2. Literature Review
Earnings  management  is  the  basic  concept  of  earnings  quality.  The
reported earnings are devotedly associated with the change in net economic assets
rather  than  transactions  linked with  owners  (Schipper  & Vincent,  2003).  This
concept is totally different from the earnings quality, which is based on the time
series  properties  of  earnings  (i.e.  persistence,  predictability,  and  variability  of
earnings).  These both concepts  believe that  discretionary accruals are  used by
managers to convey their private information to investors.
There are many studies that have evaluated the ability of discretionary accruals
measurement models to divide the earnings into two parts, discretionary and non-
discretionary components by using their time series properties. We will use the
model prescribed by Dechowet. al. (1995) to measure the discretionary accruals.
Meanwhile,  well-designed  corporate  governance  structures  are  an
effective way to mitigate expropriation problems and  earnings management  (La
Porta et. al., 2000). There is prominent participation on corporate governance both
in  practice  and  in  academic  research  (Blue  Ribbon  Committee  Report  1999;
Ramsay Report  2001;  Sarbanes-Oxley 2002;  Bebchuk & Cohen 2004).  Frank
(2006) suggested that  there are  two basic  categories  for governance variables.
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First is the internal and other is external variables. External variables consist on
the  firm’s  institutional  ownership  pattern  and  takeover  pressure  on  the  firm.
While,  internal  variable  set  comprises  of  board  structure  with  the  ownership
concentration. 
Warfield  (1995)  examined the  impact  of  accounting  policies  for  larger
firms. He found market considers that earnings of larger firms are more persistent
than  the  earnings  of  smaller  firms.  Company  size  is  important  factor  when
considering the information asymmetry of a firm from the investors. Managers of
small firms can hide their private information more successfully as compared to
larger firms. Larger firms have more publically available information. So, market
can have more information about larger firms as compared to smaller firms that
will help them in the pricing of discretionary accruals. 
Studies done to examine the pricing of accruals have found the association
between market prices and discretionary accruals to be positive (Subramanyam,
1996; Beaver & Engel,  1996; Chung, Ho, & Kim, 2001). These studies found
significant evidence about the market measuring discretionary accruals.
However, there are two types of earning management.  First  is  efficient
earnings  management  and  the  second  is  opportunistic  earnings  management.
Efficient  earnings  management  is  used  to  improve  the  information  content
communicated  to  private  investors.  On  the  other  hand,  opportunistic  earnings
management  is  used  to  report  earnings  opportunistically  to  maximize  utility
(Scott,  2006). If market is able to differentiate between these types of earnings
management then the market will positively value efficient discretionary accruals
and  will  negatively  price  opportunistic  discretionary  accruals.  Schipper  and
Vincent  (2003)  also  mentioned  that  manipulation  of  earnings  against  the
accounting standards adversely affects  the shareholders  and is  totally different
from the concept of true representation of earnings. Hamid et. al. (2014)found that
all  corporate administration and money related characteristics variables have a
noteworthy relationship with earnings management rehearses.
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Tang,  Chen,  and Chang (2013) researched the  endogenous  relationship
between unusual insider exchanging and accrual mishandling,  and investigated
whether  corporate  administration  influences  this  relationship  or  not.  Results
suggested that insiders exploit private data on abnormal accruals to time their sale
of securities. More critical in this regard are those instances in which the misuse
of  inside  data  for  stock  trading  turns  out  to  be  more  genuine,  and especially
problematic when this controller of information is not a majority shareholder thus
misaligned from income group. Therefore, higher family ownership and control,
expanded  administrative  ownership,  or  a  double  leadership  structure  not  only
affects more private data exchange between company and shareholders but also
reduces the probability of information misappropriation. 
Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012) found that the probability and speed
of  CEO  turnover  are  significantly  identified  with  an  organization's  earnings
management. They found that the connection between earnings management and
forceful CEO turnover existed in both firms with great and terrible strategy as
before the accruals were used to flatten the reported earnings and in the latter to
fatten  the  reported  earnings.  These  results  showed  that  boards  tend  to  act
proactively to train managers who oversee earnings, before the controls lead to
immoderate outer consequences.
Hsu and Wen (2015) investigated the impact of ownership structure and
board characteristics on discretionary accruals and real earnings management. The
results  demonstrated  that  establishments  with  high  shareholding  proportion  or
extraordinary  shareholding  focus  give  managers  incentives  to  control
discretionary accruals  for  short-term profitability. The more  significant  insider
possessions can adequately regulate managers and restrict  them to control real
earnings and to bring about the impediment of firm value. With respect to board
structure, setting up independent directors is incapable in monitoring the earnings
management conduct of the managers. With the duality of the board chairman and
CEO, the organization would control discretionary accruals to meet its objective
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due to entrenchment impact. The bigger the board size, the more capacity for the
board to monitor whether the managers conduct earnings management.
Chekili (2012) figured that vicinity of outer directors inside of the board,
board size and vicinity of a CEO appear to affect earnings management while the
other board characteristics are observed to be unbiased.
Firms with the higher institutional ownership need more management monitoring
actions as they have larger economic interest in those firms (Financial Statement
Roundtable, 1999). It is further found by many researches on the monitoring role
of institutional investors.  Bushee, (1998) concluded that such organizations give
less incentive for management to reduce R&D expenses and target the short-term
goals. This shows that institutional investors play an important role in monitoring
the management actions.
Further, earlier  studies  also find  that  earnings  management  in  business
group firms is higher than other firms with no business group. In this way, firms
with the family ownership and no business group have lesser opportunistic and
more efficient earnings management. Market must analyze this situation and then
do  the  price  of  discretionary  accruals  positively  for  the  firms  having  family
ownership and no business group as compare to other firms (Kim&Yi, 2005).
There  are  only  few  researchers  in  literature  that  have  studied  the
relationship between institutional structure and discretionary accruals. Research
conducted  by  Shah  et  al  (2009)  found  a  negative  relationship  between
discretionary  accruals  and  institutional  ownership  along  with  the  corporate
governance variables. Further, Fayoumi et al., (2010) examined that there is no
universal and authentic evidence related to the impact of institutional structure on
the discretionary accruals.
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3. Hypothesis
In order  to attain the main purpose of this  study, these hypotheses have been
developed to be tested:
H1: There is an impact of discretionary accruals on stock return.
H2: There is an impact of discretionary accruals on stock return for the firms with
higher family ownership.
H3: There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent board and
the effect of discretionary accruals on stock return.
4.   Research Methodology
4.1          Sample Selection
Current study selected a sample of only 30 companies of sugar industry
which have been listed on Karachi Stock Exchange and used data for the period of
2008-2013. The list of all selected companies has been mentioned in iAppendix.
The  final  sample  of  this  study  includes  150  Firms-year  observations  (30
companies time 5 years).
This study uses yearly data due to the limitations of corporate governance related
data and the possibility of biasness from the different datasets that are different in
observed  frequencies.  Therefore,  to  match  the  frequencies  and  investigate  the
impact of corporate governance quality, ownership and firm size, we use yearly
data for this study of all the variables in performing analysis. This method of data
matching is also used in literature (e.g., Klock et al., 2005; Jiraporn et al., 2006;
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Chava et al., 2009). 
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4.2            Research Model
This study used the following research model to test hypothesis H1:
Model 1
RET it=α+β1NDAC it+ β2DAC it+ β3 BOD+β4DFAM it+ β5 INST it+β6DSIZEit+ β7 AUDIT it+β8 AUDCOM it+β9BM it+v
Where:
RET = Market adjusted return for 12 months period.
BOD = Proportion of independent board.
NDAC = Non-discretionary accruals.
DAC = Discretionary accruals.
DFAM = 1 if firm have proportion of family ownership > 50%, not belonging to
business groups and 0 otherwise.
INST = Proportion of institutional ownership.
DSIZE = Natural logarithm of market capitalization.
AUDIT = 1 if firm audited by category “A” auditors by SBP and 0 otherwise.
AUDCOM = 1 if firm have audit committee and 0 otherwise.
BM = Book-to-market ratio
To test hypotheses H2-H3, we use following research model:
MODEL 2
RET it=α+β1NDAC it+ β2DAC it+ β3DAC it∗DFAM it+β4DAC it∗INST it+ β5DAC it∗BODit+β6DAC it∗DSIZEit+β7DAC it∗AUDIT it+β8DACit∗AUDCOM it+β9DFAM it+ β10 INST it+β11DSIZEit+ β12 AUDIT it+β13 AUDCOM it+ β14BOD+β15BM it❑+v
The  effect  of  discretionary  accruals  on  stock  return  is  moderated  by
DFAM, INST, DSIZE, BOD, AUDIT, and AUDCOM. Therefore, in our research
model, each of these 6 variables is linked with discretionary accruals (DAC). For
our study, we use such variables which have an interaction with DAC. Therefore,
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coefficients of variables can easily show the incremental impact of each variable
on the relation of discretionary accruals and stock return. 
For example, if DFAM = 0, then the stock return will be affected by β2
due  to  discretionary  accruals.  If  DFAM=1,  then  the  impact  of  discretionary
accruals on stock return will be β2∧β3 . β3  is the difference of DFAM=0 and
DFAM=1, which acts as the coefficient of interacting variable.
4.3         Measurement of Variables
Stock Return: Stock return is calculated as the difference between actual
stock return and market return as market adjusted return. For this study, return is
calculated on yearly basis.
Discretionary Accruals:  Total  accruals  can be  defined as  the difference
between net income and cash flow from operating activities of each firm (ACCR
= EARN – CFO).CFO is defined as the net cash flow of the firms from their
operating  activities  and  earnings  as  the  net  income  of  the  firm  before  any
extraordinary items. 
To calculate the total  accruals,  we use one of the following mentioned
models based on the highest value of adjusted R
2
.  The model that we have
tested for highest adjusted R
2
 are mentioned below:
Model 3-A(Jones, J.J. -1991)
ACCR it=α+β1∆REV it+β2PPEit+ϵ it
Where: ACCR = Total accruals, 
ΔREV = Change in revenue from year t-1 to year t (REV t−REV t−1 ) .
PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t. All variables are scaled by
beginning total assets.
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Model 3-B (Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G. and Sweeney, A.P. -1995)
∆ REV
[¿ ¿it−∆ REC it ]+β2PPE it+ϵ it
ACCRit=α+β1¿
Where:  ΔREC  =  change  in  net  accounts  receivables  from year  t-1  to  year  t
(REC t−REC t−1 ) . All variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
Model 3-C (Kasznik, R. 1999)
∆ REV
[¿ ¿it−∆ REC it ]+β2PPE it+β3∆CFOit+ϵ it
ACCR it=α+β1¿
Where: ΔCFO = Change in cash flows from operation from operation from year t-
1 to year t (CFOt−CFOt−1 ) . All variables are scaled by beginning total assets.
Values get from the above suitable model will be the values of non-discretionary
accruals and discretionary accruals are defined as the residuals like:
DA = ACC – NDA
4.4          Family Ownership and Business Group
Family ownership is defined as all individuals and firms whose ownership
listed, is not public, financial institutions and public (individuals whose ownership
is  not  listed).  Ownership should be listed when ownership is  greater  than 5%
(Arifin,  Z., 2003). Sample firms are classified as firms with family ownership
(family ownership > 50%) and low family ownership (family ownership < 50%).
Then, we make dummy variable where 1 for firms with high family ownership
and with no business groups and 0 for otherwise.
4.5           Institutional Ownership
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Institutional  ownership  can  be  defined  as  the  percentage  of  shares  or
ownership held by institutions that include shares owned by social security and
other funds. Insurance companies (life and non-life), mutual funds, pension funds
and  investment  companies,  and  financial  institutions  i.e.  banks  are  classified
under the definition of institutions (Koh, 2003).
4.6             Firm Size
This study uses natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for the firm
size. Firm’s decisions about accruals management are influenced by the firm size
as well. We supposed that large firms are more visible (Watts and Zimmerman,
1986)  and  can  easily  manage  the  earnings  to  minimize  the  effect  of  political
visibility (Moses, 1987; Hsu and Koh 2005).
Nevertheless,  literature  also  have  some studies  which  argue that  larger
firms have more information that can be scrutinized by the analysts and income of
larger  firms  smoothed  by the  investors  add  little  value  (Ashari  et  al.,  1994).
Accordingly they have fewer incentives to smooth the earnings of larger firms
(Atik, 2008). Therefore, in literature, we do not have any specific information that
can  be  predicted  about  the  relationship  between  firm  size  and  discretionary
accruals.
5. Corporate Governance Practices
5.1        Independent board (bod)
Proportion of independent board is calculated as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total board size.
5.2         Auditor size (audit)
In our study, we used auditor size variable in order to measure the quality 
of audit as a dummy variable. We use 1, if firm is audited by category “a” auditors
by sbp and 0 otherwise.
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5.3       Existence of audit committee
In our study, we used a dummy for this variable where 1 if firm is having
an audit committee and 0 otherwise.
5.4       Book-to-market ratio
Book to Market ratio is used as a control variable in this study to control
the incentives that can influence the manager’s discretionary accounting choices.
Book to market  ratio  is  calculated as ending book value of equity divided by
ending market value of equity.
6. Results
6.1      Evaluation of Earnings Management Model
We evaluate  each  earnings  management  model  on  the  basis  of  their
explanatory power (Adjusted R
2 ¿ . The below mention table 1 shows the results
of  each  model  3-A,  3-B and 3-C.  As  model  3-C  shows  the  highest  value  of
Adjusted R
2
. Therefore, we recommend this model for our main analysis.
Table 1: Earnings evaluation model
Measurement Model
Adjusted R
2
3-A 0.219
3-B 0.221
3-C 0.223
6.2          The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals
The above mentioned table shows the summary statistics of each variable
in the study. All these summary statistics values are before transformation. After
this,  transformed  all  the  variables  then  perform  regression  and  check  the
correlation between the variables as well. But, before going further, we check all
the assumptions of regression analysis  like test  the linearity, normality for the
dependent and independent variables.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
 AUDIT AUDCOM DFAM INST RET BM DSIZE DAC NDAC BOD
AUDIT Pearson 
Correlation
1 -.286** -0.134 .332** 0.143 0.09 0.133 -0.097 -0.155 -0.157
Sig. (2-tailed)  0 0.103 0 0.081 0.275 0.105 0.237 0.059 0.055
AUDCOM Pearson 
Correlation
-.286** 1 .267** 0.112 -0.036 0.117 0.152 -.165* -0.038 +0.074
Sig. (2-tailed) 0  0.001 0.173 0.658 0.155 0.064 0.044 0.641 0.368
DFAM Pearson 
Correlation
-0.134 .267** 1 .333** 0.118 0.143 -0.034 -0.064 0.144 .346**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.103 0.001  0 0.15 0.082 0.681 0.438 0.078 0
INST Pearson 
Correlation
.332** 0.112 .333** 1 0.124 0.145 0.028 .213** 0.108 -0.104
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.173 0  0.132 0.077 0.738 0.009 0.187 0.205
RET Pearson 
Correlation
0.143 -0.036 0.118 0.124 1 -0.004 0.025 -0.006 0.035 -0.013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.081 0.658 0.15 0.132  0.96 0.764 0.938 0.674 0.876
BM Pearson 
Correlation
0.09 0.117 0.143 0.145 -0.004 1 -.213** .254** .164* -0.035
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.275 0.155 0.082 0.077 0.96  0.009 0.002 0.045 0.671
DSIZE Pearson 
Correlation
0.133 0.152 -0.034 0.028 0.025 -.213** 1 -.771** -.295** -0.06
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.105 0.064 0.681 0.738 0.764 0.009  0 0 0.463
DAC Pearson 
Correlation
-0.097 -.165* -0.064 .213** -0.006 .254** -.771** 1 .479** 0.009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.237 0.044 0.438 0.009 0.938 0.002 0  0 0.914
NDAC Pearson 
Correlation
-0.155 -0.038 0.144 0.108 0.035 .164* -.295** .479** 1 0.11
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.059 0.641 0.078 0.187 0.674 0.045 0 0  0.181
BOD Pearson 
Correlation
-0.157 +0.074 .346** -0.104 -0.013 -0.035 -0.06 0.009 0.11 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.055 0.368 0 0.205 0.876 0.671 0.463 0.914 0.181  
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 2 shows correlation matrix of each variable that has been used in
this  study. Correlation  matrix  shows positive  correlation  between  AUDIT and
DSIZE. It  shows that  firms larger  in size tend to be audited by category “A”
auditors.  Positive correlation between AUDCOM and BOD clearly shows that
firms with high proportion of independent directors in their board tend to have
audit committee. Most of the firms among our selected sample are non DFAM
firms and are audited by Category A auditors.
RET it=α+β1NDAC it+ β2DAC it+ β3 BOD+β4DFAM it+ β5 INST it+β6DSIZEit+ β7 AUDIT it+β8 AUDCOM it+β9BM it+v
Table 3: Statistical Data
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics p-value
Constant 0.212 0.124 0.092
DAC 0.210 1.689 0.097
NDAC -0.378 -0.286 0.47
AUDIT 0.245 1.812 0.076
AUDCOM -0.264 -2.037 0.047
DFAM 0.169 1.123 0.266
INST 0.095 0.688 0.495
BOD -0.184 -1.311 0.196
DSIZE 0.158 1.012 0.316
BM 0.064 0.472 0.639
R square 0.249
F-Statistics 1.994
DW-test 2.052
p-value (F-statistics) 0.058
*Dependent variable: RET = market adjusted return.
Independent  variables:  BOD  =  proportion  of  independent  board,  NDAC  =  non-discretionary
accruals, DAC = discretionary accruals, DFAM = 1 if firms have high family ownership and not
belonging to business groups and 0 otherwise, INST = institutional ownership, DSIZE = 1 if firms
in the 50% highest market capitalization and 0 otherwise, AUDIT = 1 if firms audited by big 4
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auditors and 0 otherwise, AUDCOM = 1 if firms have audit committee and 0 otherwise, BM =
book-to-market ratio.
*** Significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%*
Table 3 represents the regression result for model-1. From these results, F-
Value for this  regression model  is  1.994, which is  significant (0.058<0.1) and
almost 25% variance has been explained by the model, it shows that the model
can be significantly used to test  the impact of discretionary accruals on stock
returns. As this model for adjusted market return is significant, it shows that there
is a linear relationship between the variables in the model.
As DW test value is 2.052, which are between two critical values 1.5 to
2.00, it is a proof that there is not any type of first order linear auto-correlation
between the data. There is no multi-co-linearity problem as it clearly shows from
the values of VIF, condition index values, Tolerance and Eigen values. As all the
Eigen values are greater than one, variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 2
and condition index values are less than 15 and values in case of tolerance are
greater than zero as well. All these evidences show that there is no issue of multi-
co-linearity between the variables in the used regression model for the adjusted
stock returns.
The  above  mentioned  results  show  that  DAC coefficient  is  positively
significant  which  predicts  that  market  valuation  of  discretionary  accruals  is
positive. When market is efficient then this result clearly shows that the firm will
not go for opportunistic earnings management. Results of this regression model
clearly  shows  that  our  hypothesis  H1  has  been  accepted,  which  means  that
discretionary accruals have significant impact on the stock return.
Table  4  shows  the  results  for  hypothesis.  Value  for  hypothesis  2H  is
negative and highly insignificant which shows that family ownership does not
have any impact on the relation between discretionary accruals and stock return.
There may be negative impact of family ownership on the pricing of discretionary
accruals. Firms with high family ownership tend to take more personal beneficial
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decisions than that of other shareholders. As, market take family ownership as a
negative impact on the pricing of discretionary accruals. We can take it as another
perspective.
Hypothesis  H3  is  supported  by  our  results  which  state  a  positive
relationship  between  proportion  of  institutional  ownership  and  the  effect  of
discretionary accruals on stock return. As a result institutional investors are able
to have any impact on management’s policy and market may not consider family
ownership as an effective and significant factor in the pricing of discretionary
accruals. We can take it in another way. Most of the investors tend to be interested
in  long-term focus  and  may put  more  pressure  on  management.  In  this  way,
market can consider institutional ownership as an important factor in the pricing
of discretionary accruals.
RET it=α+β1NDAC it+ β2DAC it+ β3DAC it∗DFAM it+β4DAC it∗INST it+ β5DAC it∗BODit+β6DAC it∗DSIZEit+β7DAC it∗AUDIT it+β8DACit∗AUDCOM it+β9DFAM it+ β10 INST it+β11DSIZEit+ β12 AUDIT it+β13 AUDCOM it+ β14BOD+β15BM it❑+v
Table 4: Statistical Data
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics p-value
Constant -1.443 -0.425 0.073
DAC -0.047 -0.283 0.778
NDAC 0.240 1.728 0.090
DAC*INST 0.465 1.830 0.074
DAC*AUDIT -0.281 0.965 0.033
DAC*AUDCOM 7.370 1.198 0.237
DAC*SIZE -5.594 -0.976 0.334
DAC*DFAM -0.810 -1.552 0.127
DAC*BOD 1.227 2.222 0.031
AUDIT 0.0213 1.001 0.322
AUDCOM 0.379 0.737 0.465
BOD 0.018 0.097 0.923
DFAM -0.016 -0.067 0.947
INST 0.278 1.356 0.181
DSIZE 0.065 0.277 0.783
BM 0.015 0.100 0.920
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 R square 0.351
F-statistics 1.732
DW-test 1.939
p-value (F-statistics) 0.076
*Dependent variable: RET = market adjusted return.
Independent variables: BOD =Proportion of independent board, NDAC = non-discretionary accruals, DAC = 
discretionary accruals, DFAM = 1 if firms have high family ownership and 0 otherwise, INST = institutional 
ownership, DSIZE = 1 if firms in the 50% highest market capitalization and 0 otherwise, AUDIT = 1 if firms 
audited by big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise, AUDCOM = 1 if firms have audit committee and 0 otherwise, BM 
= book-to-market ratio.
*** Significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%
7. Conclusion
This study examined the pricing of discretionary accruals and investigates
that whether market attaches any value on discretionary accruals. This study also
investigates that whether ownership structure, firm size and corporate governance
affect these pricing of discretionary accruals of Pakistani Sugar firms during the
period  2008-2013.  Results  of  all  empirical  models  (Regression)  concluded  a
significant relationship in the favor of positive market pricing of discretionary
accruals  with  institutional  ownership,  audit  quality  and  board  independence.
Other variables like family ownership structure, firm size and other governance
practices found to be insignificant and did not show any impact on the significant
relationship discretionary accruals and higher stock returns. It is finally concluded
that firms with larger share of independent board, institutional ownership and high
quality  of  audit  will  have  more  chances  to  have  a  strong  impact  on  the
relationship between pricing of discretionary accruals and market returns.
Like other studies, this study also has some limitations. First is related to
the ability of measurement model 3-A to accurately divide the accruals into two
components,  discretionary  and  non-discretionary  accruals.  Question  mark  still
exists on the efficiency of this model and misclassification of discretionary and
non-discretionary accruals.  Second one  is  about  the  lack  of  data  of  corporate
governance  index.  For  this  study,  we  have  used  only  audit  quality,  audit
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committee, BOD variables to measure the quality of corporate governance of the
firm.  There  is  no  proper  source  in  Pakistan  from  where  we  can  easily  get
corporate  governance  index  data  except  the  code  of  corporate  governance  in
Pakistan by SECP. This study use firm size, ownership structure and governance
practices  to  test  its  impact  on the  pricing of  discretionary accruals.  There are
many other factors that can affect the pricing of discretionary accruals in better
way. Inclusion of more independent and control variables are recommended to be
added to get more significant findings.
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